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 LESSONS FROM NEUROSCIENCE AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR A 
PARTNERSHIP SOCIETY 
 
Daniel S. Levine, PhD 
 
Abstract 
This century has seen explosive growth in our knowledge about the human brain and mind due to recent 
advances in neuroscience, experimental psychology, and neural network modeling, and convergence 
between those fields. The scientific findings that have emerged confirm that humans have evolved for 
partnership and cooperation at least as much as they have evolved for domination and competition. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that partnership interactions promote optimal brain functioning. 
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THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND 
 
Many of us involved in the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s hoped that the 
trends of that period heralded a new age in human relations and mutual compassion. 
We kept saying that technology was already way ahead of our understanding of each 
other and that we needed advances in human relations to catch up to technological 
advances. We believed that our advocacy of making love not war, and of more open 
roles for people regardless of gender and race, would be the first steps toward making 
that happen. 
 
Yet that period of promise ended up with the most visible representatives of the 
changing times being, not social reformers, but Silicon Valley technological 
entrepreneurs such as Steve Jobs (Isaacson, 2011). The Internet, smart phones, and 
other devices and apps have provided great benefits for communication of like-minded 
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 people across long distances, even enabling the publication of partnership-oriented 
journals like this one. Yet many of the short-term effects of rapid technological growth 
on society have been less than beneficial: rising inequality of income, loss of stable 
employment for many, and a harried pace of life even for economically successful 
people trying to keep up with the changes. Thus overall the growth of thoughtful human 
relations has lagged ever further behind the growth of technology. 
 
Paradoxically, while the growth of technology is the fruit of scientific advances, it has 
not increased scientific literacy among people as a whole. As the journalist John Saul 
described  a generation ago (Saul, 1992), scientific and technological advances have 
instead spawned a cult of the expert, whereby average people make use of the new 
devices but treat them as magic whose workings only the savvy can understand. Recent 
changes since Saul wrote have if anything accelerated this trend. There is widespread 
ignorance, some of it willful, not only about technology but also about basic science. 
In the United States, Achenbach (2015) documents widespread distrust of 
pronouncements of scientists on everything from evolution to climate change to 
vaccines: “A THIRD (emphasis Achenbach’s) of Americans believe humans have existed 
in their present form since time began” (p. 41) and “LESS THAN HALF (emphasis 
Achenbach’s) of all Americans believe the Earth is warming because humans are burning 
fossil fuels” (p. 45). 
 
Yet (invoking another catch phrase of the 1960s and 1970s) science can become part of 
the solution instead of part of the problem. As a graduate student in mathematics 
during that period I struggled to make my own field and my training “relevant” to 
positive social change. My opportunity came when the military draft during the Vietnam 
War caused me to leave school for a research position at the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH). My stay at NIH exposed me to leading neuroscientists who were involved 
in dialogues about the role of the brain in evolution and the relationships between 
instinct, emotion, and thought. Here, I thought, neuroscience could yield clues to 
understanding, and hopefully influencing, human decisions that affect social policies, 
including the Vietnam War itself. And my mathematical training could help with 
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 developing computational theories that might tie together enormous amounts of data 
from neuroscience (both animal and human) and experimental psychology. That was 
the beginning of my long career as a computational neural network theorist. 
 
The research of several pioneers in neural networks began in the 1960s before there 
were widespread personal computers and ability to transfer files electronically. It also 
began before the wide availability of functional magnetic resonance imaging and other 
tools for non-invasively recording the activity of human brain regions during the 
performance of cognitive and behavioral tasks. So it took many decades for the brain 
to be well enough understood that the findings of neuroscience could be useful in 
promoting broad understanding of human social behavior. But in the 21ST Century 
enough results in cognitive and behavioral neuroscience have emerged that the field 
can start to inform social policies. Insight from neuroscience can also inform discussions 
of cultural mores that might encourage or discourage partnership interactions. 
 
In this period in which the world is rapidly growing more complex, it is tempting to feel 
that promoting partnership is simply a matter of defending previously established 
democratic, cooperative, and egalitarian values. Yet to advance the cause of 
partnership in these challenging times we must not only play defense but go on the 
offense, designing social policies and trying to influence the development of cultural 
customs that bring out the best in human potential in the information age. 
 
Going on the offense means that cherished mindsets need to be examined and changed, 
a process that is likely to be painful but ultimately rewarding. Cultural assumptions 
about many common things — including the role of technology, traits we attribute to 
groups of people (e.g., genders or ethnic groups), how we categorize, how we look at 
reason and emotion, and how we look at the individual and society — need to be 
challenged, as many are unsuited to the complexities of the current times (Clark, 1995; 
Eisler, 1995; Levine, 1998a). 
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 I will now review some of the intellectual roots of our current challenge — in particular, 
the roles of neuroscience, experimental psychology, and neural network theory in 
understanding the bases of partnership interactions. 
 
INTELLECTUAL ROOTS 
 
Neuroscience 
Until the 1960s most neuroscientists believed that the human brain’s connection 
patterns, and therefore its capabilities, were fixed at birth. Psychologists such as 
Sigmund Freud (1895/1966) and Donald Hebb (1949) believed there must be some 
change going on in the brain when people and animals learn a new association, such as 
in conditioning. Freud and Hebb both conjectured the existence of plasticity at synapses 
between neurons; that is, they believed that some connections would become more 
likely to transmit electrical impulses if the concepts coded by the two neurons they 
linked were repeatedly presented together. Yet such plasticity was not observed in 
neuroscience laboratories until the work of Nobel laureate Eric Kandel (e.g., Kandel & 
Tauc, 1965) who discovered in the California sea slug (Aplysia) a mechanism called 
heterosynaptic facilitation, a change in synaptic efficacy (or cellular excitability) in 
one neuron as a result of release of a modulatory transmitter from another neuron.  
  
In mammal brains, the first significant observation of plasticity was made by Timothy 
Bliss and Terje Lømo (1973), who demonstrated in the rabbit hippocampus – a key region 
for laying down traces of new memories — a phenomenon they called long-term 
potentiation (LTP). Bliss and Lømo defined LTP as a persistent enhancement of synaptic 
efficacy generally produced as a result of delivering a brief (several second) 
high-frequency train of electrical stimuli to an incoming pathway. In other words, an 
existing synapse becomes strengthened, in the sense that an electrical impulse to the 
incoming pathway becomes more likely to cause electrical activity in the neuron to 
which it connects. This increase in synaptic strength can last up to several hours in an 
interconnected group of isolated neurons grown in the laboratory, and up to several 
days in a living animal. 
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 Other scientists showed that LTP can be enhanced while the animal is learning 
associations between concepts. Many scientists now believe that the cellular changes 
related to LTP make the hippocampus uniquely suitable for its job of encoding learned 
associations between concepts and laying down memory traces. 
 
The brain is most plastic during childhood but still remains subject to change in 
adulthood, to varying degrees along different pathways (Begley, 2007; Byrne, 
Heidelberger, & Waxham, 2014). Because of this childhood plasticity, the brain’s 
connections as an adult are highly influenced by early experience. This was first 
discovered in the 1960s and 1970s with sensory systems, to the surprise of 
neuroscientists. For example, Hirsch and Spinelli (1970) found that kittens who were 
raised in environments without visual inputs of specific line orientations (such as 
vertical or horizontal) grew up to be adult cats that were blind to those orientations. 
The partial blindness occurred because cells in the cats’ visual cortex that normally 
would respond to lines they had not seen were re-coded to lines the cats had seen. 
 
Since the early 1990s a host of animal and human studies have found major lasting 
effects of early experience on areas of the brain involved in both cognitive and 
emotional functions. These areas include the hippocampus, where short-term memories 
are consolidated in long-term memory; the amygdala, main site of emotional 
evaluations; and the frontal lobes, a key area for planning, decision making, and moral 
judgment. In particular, these regions function differently in individuals who were 
abused or neglected as children than in individuals raised in caring environments. That 
literature is summarized in several other articles (e.g., Eisler, 2014; Eisler & Levine, 
2002; Levine, 2008) and partially reviewed here. 
 
One of the first scientists to study the effects of childhood abuse on the adult brain was 
Bruce Perry (e.g., Perry, Pollard, Blakley, Baker, & Vigilante, 1995; Perry, 2002). Perry 
and his colleagues found that in children who are repeatedly physically or sexually 
abused, the biochemical system that gets active in response to stress becomes 
chronically sensitized. This system, which includes parts of the brain, endocrine glands, 
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 and connections to other organs, is called the hypothalamic-pituitary axis (HPA). HPA 
activity particularly involves two biochemical substances: norepinephrine, the neural 
transmitter closely related to arousal, and cortisol, the hormone related to stress. In 
individuals whose lives are not overly stressed, the level of cortisol goes back down 
after the danger has passed. Yet in chronically abused individuals, this level remains 
permanently high. This means the person is more likely to have an arousal response to 
stimuli that are milder than the initial traumatic events. Norepinephrine tends to 
remain higher than normal in some individuals who react to abuse by a chronic fight-
or-flight mode, but is lower than normal in others who react to abuse by becoming 
dissociated. Perry et al. (1995) found that the fight-or-flight pattern is more common 
in males, and the dissociative pattern is more common in females.   
 
Since 1995 there have been a number of studies of the cortisol and norepinephrine 
systems in people subject to chronic stress, including social exclusion as well as violence 
and poverty (e.g., Gunnar and Herrera, 2013; Knack, Jensen-Campbell, & Baum, 2011; 
Miller, Chen, & Zhou, 2007). Cortisol levels are sometimes unusually high in chronically 
stressed individuals and sometimes unusually low, but generally are abnormal in some 
way. Typically, in chronically stressed people the cortisol level remains constant rather 
than going up or down with either the time of day or the presence or absence of 
stressors. 
 
The abnormalities in chronically stressed individuals are not only in emotional reactivity 
but also in cognitive function. Sustained stress particularly has negative effects on the 
function of the hippocampus, the area of brain that plays an essential role in 
consolidation of new memories and acquisition of information. Sapolsky (2003) 
reviewed evidence that cortisol and various forms of stress (including physical restraint) 
reduce neural plasticity in the hippocampus in both rodents and primates. At the same 
time, cortisol and stress increase plasticity in the amygdala, the major site of emotional 
memories, and thereby enhance conditioned fears including negative emotional 
reactions to places and other stimuli associated with stressful events. Sapolsky notes 
that mild stress can be experienced as a challenge and thus can enhance cognitive 
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 performance; this author outlines the differences between two different types of 
cortisol receptors in the brain that mediate the helpful versus the harmful effects of 
stress. A more recent human brain imaging study found that a higher degree of maternal  
or caregiver nurturance (demonstrated by the strategies caregivers used to regulate a 
child’s impulse to open a gift for which they are asked to wait) is positively correlated 
with a larger volume of the child’s hippocampus when the child reaches school age 
(Luby et al., 2012). 
 
There are also neural systems that become more active with positive social 
interactions: these particularly involve two related peptide hormones, oxytocin and 
vasopressin. Social psychologist Shelley Taylor and colleagues (Taylor et al., 2000) 
described what they called the tend-and-befriend response that women and female 
animals often employ as a response to stress, in preference to the traditionally studied 
fight-or-flight response. The tend-and-befriend response, mediated by the brain’s 
oxytocin system, includes both tending of offspring and social bonding between females 
(mutual grooming for nonhuman animals, friendship for humans) around mutual 
protection of selves and offspring. Other results to be cited hint that these mechanisms 
exist in male animals as well, despite gender differences in amounts of some 
biochemical substances involved. 
 
The hormone oxytocin, found only in mammals, was first discovered to be essential for 
maternal physiologic functions such as uterine contraction and milk ejection. But 
Thomas Insel, James Winslow, and their colleagues discovered that oxytocin has 
broader importance for bonding, in male as well as female animals (Insel, 1992; Insel & 
Winslow, 1998; Winslow, Shapiro, Carter, & Insel, 1993). Insel and Winslow studied two 
species of North American rodents that are closely related but have radically different 
social organizations: the prairie vole, which is monogamous, with strong male-female 
pair bonding and both parents involved in care of young, and the montane vole, which 
is promiscuous, with fathers uninvolved with young. They found that oxytocin attaches 
to receptor molecules in reward-related areas of the brain in the pair-bonding prairie 
vole but not in the non-bonding montane vole. Analogous results were seen in a 
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 comparison between two closely related species of monkeys.  Rosenblum et al. (2002) 
found that bonnet macaques, who tend to be gregarious, affiliative, and emotionally 
stable, have higher levels of oxytocin and lower levels of a substance involved in 
production of the stress hormone cortisol in their cerebrospinal fluid than pigtail 
macaques, who tend to be emotionally volatile and socially distant. 
 
In humans, Kosfeld et al. (2005) found that intranasal administration of oxytocin to men 
playing a simulated investment game increased their ability to trust their partners. 
Results of a more recent study by DeDreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, and Handgraaf 
(2011), however, suggest that the trust could be selective rather than universal. 
Specifically, Dutch subjects showed increased trust of other native Dutch people but 
not of immigrant Muslims. That result is unsettling for those interested in the biological 
roots of partnership interactions, but it is consistent with the selectivity of pair bonding 
(and of friendship, where oxytocin may also be involved). Perhaps an ability to 
empathize with people who are very different from us requires not only oxytocin 
binding to emotional reward areas but also the cognitive element of seeing people of a 
different nationality or ethnicity as analogous to us. This cognitive aspect of empathy 
is likely to require the activity of regions of the prefrontal cortex which process 
emotional and social information. 
 
Uvnäs-Moberg (1998) reviewed evidence that oxytocin administration in both male and 
female rats appears to counteract many of the typical physiological and behavioral 
effects of stress. For example, oxytocin administration is related to decreases in blood 
pressure and in levels of cortisol. More generally, oxytocin administration reduces 
activity in the sympathetic part of the autonomic nervous system, the part that is 
activated in the fight-or-flight response. Uvnäs-Moberg (1998) reviewed studies showing 
that the physiological anti-stress effects of oxytocin occur in association with both 
lactation and sexual intercourse, and conjectured that oxytocin is also released by 
other forms of pleasurable social contact such as mutual grooming in animals and 
supportive friendship in humans. Heinrichs, Baumgartner, Kirschbaum, and Ehlert 
(2003) found evidence for oxytocin’s role in positive social contact. These researchers 
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 gave adult men stressful tasks (public speaking and mental arithmetic); before the test 
the participants were either given intranasal oxytocin, asked to bring their best friend 
for social support, both, or neither. Both oxytocin and social support substantially 
reduced the amount of cortisol induced by the tasks, and oxytocin enhanced the anti-
stress effect of social support. 
 
When people in universities and granting agencies speak about the social benefits of 
increasing our understanding of the brain, they speak primarily of the role of 
neuroscience in helping to treat neurological and mental disorders. In fact, the opening 
statement of the United States’ current brain research initiative 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/share/brain-initiative) is: “President Obama is making 
new investments in the ‘BRAIN’ Initiative — a bold new research effort to revolutionize 
our understanding of the human mind and uncover new ways to treat, prevent, and 
cure brain disorders like Alzheimer’s, schizophrenia, autism, epilepsy, and traumatic 
brain injury.” More recently, there has also been wide interest in what neuroscience 
tells us about how people learn, which has inspired the development of “brain 
exercising” software such as Lumosity, and efforts by school systems to introduce more 
“brain-friendly” curricula. 
 
All of these applications are vitally needed and welcome. Yet there has been less 
interest in the equally important issue of what neuroscience tells us about how to 
structure society, both at the formal level of social and economic policies and the 
informal level of social customs and mores. Now we have enough emergent knowledge 
about the brain that we can make arguments based on neuroscience for the beneficial 
effects of partnership interactions and the harmful effects of dominator interactions 
on society as a whole, as well as on each of its members.  
 
Decision psychology 
Before the late 1960s, the study of human decision making was dominated by a theory, 
derived from economics, which assumed people were rational, self-interested actors. 
In this outlook, an individual’s preferences were stable, quantifiable, and consistent, 
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 and obeyed certain straightforward mathematical rules. That outlook was challenged 
by the findings of several psychologists, most notably Daniel Kahneman (who 
subsequently won the economics Nobel Prize in 2002) and Amos Tversky (who probably 
would have shared that prize had he been alive then). Kahneman and Tversky found 
that people’s preferences between two alternatives were often inconsistent across 
different ways in which the alternatives were framed (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). Moreover, they found that both preferences and numerical judgments were often 
biased by rules of thumb (heuristics) that arose naturally from experience but lacked 
logical foundation (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 
Tversky and Kahneman’s results were sometimes interpreted as pointing to the “dark 
side” of human nature - that is, to the inability of sweet reason to control our irrational 
natures. Indeed, the heuristics and framing effects they describe do sometimes lead to 
calculation errors as well as sub-optimal choices. Yet I will argue here that Tversky and 
Kahneman’s theory of human decision making is much more consistent with a 
partnership outlook than is the rational choice theory that it displaced. Our heuristics 
and framing effects are behavioral outgrowths of the neural plasticity discussed in the 
previous section of this paper. Hence the results of decision psychology experiments 
suggest that if people are currently making choices that are harmful to society or to 
themselves, those choices do not necessarily represent their real or permanent 
preferences. This means that a different set of events could lead the same person to 
make more constructive choices on another occasion. 
 
Cognitive psychologists Valerie Reyna and Charles Brainerd trace human reliance on 
heuristics to our capacity for mentally simplifying and selecting from the information 
we receive rather than processing every detail of the information. In a long series of 
articles (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Reyna, Lloyd, & Brainerd, 2003; Reyna, 2012) 
these researchers develop a theory of both memory and decision making which they 
call fuzzy trace theory. Fuzzy trace theory posits the coexistence and interaction of 
two distinct systems for encoding information: literal or verbatim encoding, and 
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 intuitive or gist encoding. Verbatim encoding means literal storage of facts, whereas 
gist encoding means storing the essential intuitive meaning or “gist” of a situation. 
 
The results of Reyna, Brainerd, and their colleagues suggest that as we grow into 
adulthood we gradually rely more on gist processing than we did as children, and less 
on verbatim processing. This development is partly due to the accumulation of life 
experience and partly to an increase in time pressure. Reyna and Brainerd argue that 
gist processing, despite being less precise, is actually a more advanced form of thinking 
than verbatim processing. I agree partially, but also believe that it is important to 
consider what gists we encode - that is, which attributes of information we select for 
greater attention. Gist processing can lead us to focus on those aspects of the 
information we receive that are most relevant to our tasks. But gist processing can also 
lead us to focus on aspects that are irrelevant but feed previously established emotional 
prejudices, such as dealing with people on the basis of superficial attributes like skin 
color or facial expression. 
 
At the same time, knowing that adults use gist encoding can help us understand each 
other better. Specifically, the awareness of gist processing can make us more thoughtful 
and compassionate in our attributions of other people’s behavior. The attribute of 
another’s behavior that is most salient to us, whether positive or negative, may not be 
the attribute that is the primary motivator for that person. Applying this principle can 
help all of us to curb our initial reactions when they are likely to lead to prejudices or 
destructive confrontations. For example, a poor person who chooses public assistance 
over a low-paying dead-end job may not be irresponsible or lazy, but may just be 
choosing the best alternative in a bad situation.1 And a person taking out a high-interest 
payday loan may not be improvident for the future, but may simply doing what is 
needed to handle a present emergency. 
 
                                                 
1 This is not to mention the growing number of poorly paid workers living in expensive areas who 
require public assistance IN ADDITION TO a full-time job salary! 
11
Levine: Lessons from Neuroscience and Experimental Psychology
Produced by University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing, 2015
 While the rational self-interest model is still prevalent in economics, there is an 
increasingly influential school of behavioral economists who are recognizing that 
individual choices are not based on fixed preferences but are malleable by 
circumstances (see, e.g., Thaler, 2015). Consequently, it is incumbent on those who 
have the power to shape circumstances, whether in government, businesses, schools, 
or anywhere else, to try to make changes that can help people make decisions that are 
constructive both for themselves and for society. 
 
The application of psychological decision data to shaping personal choices is discussed 
by behavioral economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein in a book called 
Nudge (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Laissez-faire economists and other libertarians 
believe that a free market will automatically make people decide to do the things that 
most benefit themselves, including decisions that are beneficial to society (such as 
conserving energy) if those things are important to the deciders. But Thaler and 
Sunstein argue that beneficial choices are not automatic, particularly choices that 
people make infrequently (such as buying cars or houses) or do not get immediate 
feedback about (such as helping or harming the environment). These authors give many 
examples in many domains of “choice architecture” that, without imposing mandates, 
can shape people’s decisions by giving them incentives “nudges”) to do things that are 
beneficial. One of the simplest examples concerns placing of foods in cafeterias: it has 
been shown that when fresh fruits, vegetables, and other healthy foods are placed in 
easily accessible locations, and candy, potato chips, and other less healthy foods in less 
accessible locations, both children and adults tend to make healthier food choices 
(Meiselman, Hedderley, Staddon, Pierson, & Symonds, 1994; Wansink & Deshpande, 
1994). 
 
The success of nudges gives support to arguments that people should not be blamed for 
their unfavorable circumstances, even if their own decisions sometimes perpetuate 
their conditions. A further argument along these lines comes from the work of 
behavioral economist Sendil Mullainathan and psychologist Eldar Shafir (Mullainathan & 
Shafir, 2013). These researchers show that scarcity of any resource, such as money, 
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 time, or social contacts, changes people’s decision making.  Under scarcity, their 
attention becomes more focused on immediate use of the scarce resource, to the 
neglect other factors that could be important in the long term. This, rather than 
personality tendencies of the poor (a “culture of poverty”), explains some behavior of 
poor people such as borrowing money at very high interest rates; as Shah, Mullainathan, 
and Shafir (2012) put it, “Scarcity, of any kind, will create a tendency to borrow, with 
insufficient attention to whether the benefits outweigh the costs” (p. 683). These 
researchers applied the same principle to other types of scarcity, such as scarcity of 
time for very busy people. 
   
Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2006) applied the theory of decision making under 
scarcity to explanations of other financial decisions by the poor, such as not setting up 
bank accounts (therefore becoming more vulnerable to predatory lenders) and 
underutilizing government assistance programs. Their summary of their own data and 
others’ leads them to the conclusion that most poor people are open to making financial 
decisions that will benefit them more in the long run if the incentives for those decisions 
are stated clearly and honestly, if they are counseled by friendly and not overburdened 
advisors, and (contrary to mainstream economic theory) if they are not given too many 
alternative programs to choose from, in order to reduce cognitive overload. 
 
Demonization of the more disadvantaged members of society, and of those who are 
conscientiously working to help the disadvantaged, is not confined to welfare programs. 
It also occurs in the realm of public education. Many efforts at “school reform” in the 
United States during the current century have included sanctions for “underperforming 
schools” (which just happen to serve heavily low-income and minority students) and 
have suggested that ineffective teachers are a main cause of these students’ 
underperformance. Some studies of standardized tests given over several years to New 
York City area grade school students with a range of family incomes, suggest that 
blaming public schools and teachers is wrong (Gladwell, 2008). The results of these 
studies show that the gap in school performance between low- and high-income children 
does not widen, or even narrows, during the school year. But immediately after each 
13
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 summer the gap widens in favor of the high-income children. Gladwell’s explanation is 
that high-income children have more opportunities to continue learning over the 
summer, such as summer school, special classes, and camps with educational programs. 
 
In short, the portrait of human decision makers that has emerged from the cognitive 
psychology of the last fifty years is of complex individuals whose preferences violate 
any strict logical rules of consistency. This means that each of us can make either 
beneficial or harmful choices, and can be induced to make either by interpersonal and 
societal circumstances. While this view of human nature is troubling at times, it is 
consistent with arguments for a partnership society because it suggests that societal 
incentives can shape individual behavior. On the other hand, the rational choice theory 
favored by economists (sometimes called “rational man” theory, with all those words’ 
sexist connotations) is more consistent with the libertarian outlook of authors such as 
Ayn Rand (Rand, 1957). Libertarianism seems to assume that everyone does what he or 
she “wants” to do, which implies that some people deserve better lives than others 
because they choose to be more productive and industrious. Experimental psychology 
and neuroscience, by contrast, support a belief in “the inherent worth and dignity of 
every person” (Our Unitarian Universalist Principles, n.d.), which promotes active 
struggle to improve the welfare of all. 
 
The same principle applies to our attributions for people’s choices of political or 
religious affiliation, choices that support either partnership or dominator interactions. 
Rabbi Michael Lerner, in his book The Left Hand of God (2006), argues that many people 
who gravitate to the religious and/or political right do not have indelible “authoritarian 
personalities” but rather are motivated by a yearning for meaning in their lives. They 
wish to be valued for their selves and not only for their money-making potential or 
ability to meet someone else’s needs, and do not feel that the partnership-oriented 
liberals they have encountered value them in that way. The inconsistency of decision 
preferences argues that the type of people Lerner discusses are open to “nudges” that 
can move them in a partnership direction. Liberals, he suggests, can provide those 
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 nudges by avoiding labels for their political opponents and showing concern for the 
issue of meaning. 
 
Computational neural networks 
As the relationship between brain and behavior has become better understood, it is 
natural that this development has been accompanied by a growth in mathematical and 
computational models (see Levine, 2000, for review). Modeling has helped build unified 
theories out of heterogeneous experimental data from multiple sources. The sources of 
the data include electrical recordings from single neurons in the brains of behaving 
animals; functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans that shows which 
brain areas are active while they are engaged in tasks; electroencephalographic (EEG) 
recording of large regions of the human brain; studies of animals with injury to 
particular brain regions; clinical studies of patients with specific brain damage or 
specific psychiatric disorders; and behavioral studies of cognitive functions such as 
perception, attention, memory encoding, language, decision making, and planning. 
 
One of the pioneers of neural network modeling, Stephen Grossberg, stated that the 
brain’s function is to “autonomously adapt to a changing world” (Grossberg, 2006). 
Often this means that the brain must resolve paradoxes between two or more 
complementary requirements that are in seeming opposition (Grossberg, 2000). His 
examples of complementary brain processes included learning about new events while 
retaining old memories; processing both the cognitive and the motivational significance 
of incoming stimuli; and seeing both boundaries and surfaces of visual objects. Levine 
(2006a) gave some other examples of complementary brain processes within the domain 
of emotions. These included processing expected events versus processing unexpected 
events; long-term emotional evaluation versus short-term emotional reaction; 
optimizing the results of one’s action versus exploring potential new alternatives; 
personal stability versus personal growth; and self-directedness versus cooperativeness. 
 
Mathematics is a powerful tool for making sense of a confusing set of influences and for 
overcoming conventional wisdom to get to the truth. This is particularly true of the 
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 branch of mathematics called dynamical systems, defined broadly as the study of how 
sets of interacting variable quantities change over time (Abraham, Abraham, & Shaw, 
1990). Dynamical systems theory was first introduced in the late 19th Century by the 
great French mathematician Henri Poincaré to develop theories in the physical 
sciences, then gradually spread into the biological and social sciences as the variables 
in those fields became better understood. As Loye and Eisler (1987) pointed out, 
dynamical system approaches to the social sciences help to illuminate how a complex 
social system can make radical changes in direction, such as between partnership and 
dominator tendencies, in response to relatively small outside perturbing forces. 
Because complex dynamical systems are nonlinear, that is, do not respond to outside 
influences in a strict proportional manner, they can have multiple equilibrium states, 
and pushing the system away from one of the equilibria can sometimes lead them 
toward a different equilibrium. 
 
The study of dynamical systems in computational neural networks representing 
individual brains is well developed (Levine, 2000). These networks have modeled 
processes such as conditioning, working memory, vision, motor control, and decision 
making. One of the challenges for the future will be to fit models of the individual brain 
into larger models representing social systems, up to the social system of the entire 
world. A few computational models have emerged of interactions among multiple 
intelligent agents (see, e.g., Sun, 2006) but none yet with the predictive capacity that 
models of individual brains are starting to reach. Extension of some current neural 
network models to multi-person interactions is likely to generate the type of 
breakthroughs in the social sciences that Loye and Eisler (1987) proposed. 
 
Conclusion: Environment and genetics both matter 
The consensus among both behavioral biologists and science writers is that virtually all 
human behavioral tendencies are influenced by both environment and genes (Ridley, 
2003; Shermer, 2004). The old, unproductive “nature versus nurture” controversy was 
for many years a distraction from effective inquiry about the interplay of these factors. 
Ignoring nurture led to the conclusion, shown false by behavioral decision data, that 
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 people’s preferences are independent of context. On the other hand, ignoring nature 
led to a neglect of genuine individual differences.  All three of the scientific fields 
discussed in this section – neuroscience, experimental psychology, and neural network 
theory – have largely abandoned this useless dichotomy in favor of an integrated inquiry 
into how environments selectively bring out our tendencies - that is, into “nature via 
nurture” (Ridley, 2003). 
 
Moreover, scientific results argue that even those individuals who are genetically most 
oriented toward a dominator outlook are subject to environmental influences in a 
partnership direction. For example, Gariépy, Gendreau, Cairns, and Lewis (1998) and 
Gariépy and Rodriguiz (2002) bred some mice to be highly aggressive, and then reared 
them in isolation, which tends to enhance aggressiveness, up to puberty (about 45 days 
old). Then at 45 days these researchers brought the high-aggression mice out of 
isolation and placed them in groups. In their groups, many of those mice became less 
aggressive and more cooperative. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
 
The studies of stress hormones and oxytocin discussed in the previous section suggest 
that there should be profound differences between the brains of those living in a 
dominator-oriented and those living in a partnership-oriented society. There have not 
been many studies that compared brain function and structure across different 
societies. Yet the results discussed in the previous section argue for the fruitfulness of 
studying differences in brain processes between people in societies identified as 
relatively nurturing and egalitarian and people of comparable age, gender, income, and 
occupational level in societies that are more authoritarian. Such studies will require a 
wide range of techniques including fMRI to measure activities of brain regions and other 
methods for measuring (variable) functional connectivities between brain regions. 
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 The data on maternal nurturance and the brain (Luby et al., 2012) suggest the question: 
What is the societal analog of a more or a less nurturing parent?2 The psychologist 
Shelley Taylor (Taylor, 2002) asked essentially that question in the last chapter of her 
book, The Tending Instinct. Taylor concluded that one aspect of societal nurturing is 
the relative fluidity of social hierarchies, which includes relatively small income gaps. 
She cited statistics showing that life expectancies are longer in societies with smaller 
income gaps. For example, at the time she wrote, Cuba had a longer life expectancy 
than Iraq which had about the same per capita income but larger gaps, and Costa Rica 
which had narrow income gaps had a longer life expectancy than the United States 
despite a smaller per capita income. Other aspects that Taylor saw as key to a “tending 
society” included a strong influence of women in the business and political worlds; 
extensive and reliable social services including health plans; positive valuing of helping 
professions, both economically and in terms of social status; and availability of 
mentoring in job situations. 
  
Levine (2009) further explored the optimal organization of society by comparing three 
democratically organized utopian societies from 1960s and 1970s fiction (Callenbach, 
1975: Huxley, 1962; Piercy, 1976) with real modern societies. He argued that these 
fictional societies had several features in common that were different from most of the 
modern world, and that those features promoted optimal brain functioning. The “three 
pillars” of utopian societies were increased trust, community without conformity, and 
orientation toward delight. Levine (2009) found that the features that supported those 
pillars included 
 
… child-rearing based on promoting independence; family units that are larger 
or more fluid than current nuclear families; increased openness of emotional 
expression; conflict resolution that emphasizes mediation; gender equality, and 
strong roles for women; and democracy of creativity (artistic production is 
                                                 
2 The linguist George Lakoff (Lakoff, 2014) uses the terms “nurturing parent” and “stern father” 
for partnership and dominator outlooks respectively. 
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 spread across many people, talented artists and intellectuals also do manual 
work, and creativity is encouraged in mundane jobs). (p. 258) 
 
Why is each of these “utopian” features good for brain functioning? As for 
independence-oriented child-rearing, Levine (2009) noted that the prefrontal cortex, 
the part of the brain most involved in planning and in the moral sense, is developing all 
through adolescence (Thompson et al., 2000). The results on stress and early influences 
suggest that frontal development is likely to be best promoted by nurturance and 
encouragement rather than hierarchical control. Fluid families mean that children are 
exposed to multiple adult influences. Cognitive psychologists have found that learning 
of both verbal and motor skills is enhanced by their being taught in multiple contexts 
(Schmidt & Bjork, 1992), and the same is likely to be true for moral and decision-making 
skills. Emotional openness is likely to be beneficial for decision making because of the 
strong connections between the brain’s cognitive and emotional processes that are 
essential for planned behavior (Damasio, 1994).  
 
Moreover, honest assessment rather than concealment of the emotional impacts of 
decisions on people leads to more accurate assessment of the ultimate consequences 
of those decisions. An emphasis on mediation rather than winning or losing in conflict 
resolution, Levine argued, is likely to reduce the negative effects of excessive cortisol 
and promote positive affect which is beneficial for creativity. This process may involve 
dopamine transmission in the brain (Ashby, Turken, & Isen, 1999). Strong female 
influences increase the likelihood of tend-and-befriend responses to conflicts. In 
general, tend-and-befriend is most beneficial for problem solving except in the most 
dangerous situations which may require fight-or-flight responses (Taylor et al., 2000). 
 
The arguments for democracy of creativity are not yet as well supported as the others 
by neuroscience data, because they are on the social rather than the individual level.  
Yet there are behavioral studies that show the benefits for problem solving of 
encouraging creativity (Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2007). These results suggests 
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 that society functions better if it promotes creativity on the part of all people involved 
in a process, from CEOs and presidents to clerks and waiters. 
 
This article calls for more openness and more democracy in our social institutions, 
which sounds like a no-brainer (no pun intended). But people in responsible leadership 
positions in any institution, no matter how well-intentioned they may be, often carry 
over unconscious habits of thinking from dominator interactions which have been 
prevalent for so long. Therefore it takes a conscious struggle to start new ways of 
thinking and acting in any aspect of life, whether religion, politics, psychotherapy, 
family life, education, or science, for example. My book Explorations in Common Sense 
and Common Nonsense (1998a, particularly Chaps. 9 and 12) explores partnership-
oriented approaches to different segments of life, informed by human psychology and 
neuroscience. A few of these approaches are summarized next. 
 
Religion 
A partnership approach to religion falls between, and bridges, the two traditional 
extremes of authoritarian theism and secular humanism. It seeks spiritual depth and 
transcendence but relies on the individual’s inner experience and intuition rather than 
on outside authority. It accepts a diversity of theological beliefs and ritual observances, 
so that none of the world’s current major religions would “win” over the others. As a 
recent bumper sticker says, “God is too big to fit inside one religion.”  Yet it 
incorporates core beliefs about how people should treat each other. 
 
In most cultures there has been a profound difference between the inner experience of 
religion by mystics and the religious feeling of average people who observe the 
mysteries from a distance. Traditionally, average people’s religious experience tends 
to involve ritual, pageantry, a set of rules of conduct, and worship of something 
“higher” than oneself. In a genuine partnership society, average people’s religious 
experience would become more similar to the experience of mystics. That is, people in 
general would reach a direct appreciation of our place in the cosmos and its purpose. 
This would require fluidity and depth of feeling and perception, which eschews formal 
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 rules but integrates all major subsystems of both the mind/brain and the body. It would 
involve a long-term view of things, a perspective that transcends current needs and 
stresses to see larger plans.   
 
This kind of religion encourages both people and institutions to be more patient and 
less hurried than they are in the present. Hence it values contemplation and visionary 
thinking as well as moral action. Good use of the integrative, planning capacity of the 
brain’s frontal lobes, which integrate reason, emotion, and instinct, becomes a 
religious obligation. 
 
The traditional notion of God as an external authority figure, distinct from and eternally 
better than us, would be replaced by an idea from what anthropologist Gregory Bateson 
termed “the theology of Alcoholics Anonymous” (AA; Bateson, 1972, pp. 331-335). AA’s 
12-Step Program says that there is a power greater than the self, but that the believer 
must formulate his or her own understanding of the nature of the power (see for 
example Alcoholics Anonymous Comes of Age, p. 288). It’s not a power that can reward 
or punish, nor is it a dictator. Most important, the higher power is not separate from us 
but rather includes and is larger than all of us.  
 
Psychotherapy 
Individual and group psychotherapy in Western countries has tended to react to overly 
strict parental and religious control by focusing on individual freedom, self-acceptance, 
and living in the present. Also, psychotherapy has reacted to society’s tendency to over-
intellectualize issues by focusing on emotion and intuition. Yet these reactions carry 
the danger of supporting the excesses of individualistic capitalism. In order to prepare 
patients or clients for living better in a partnership society, psychotherapy needs to re-
integrate concern for others (see Nicholas, 1994) and respect for the intellect. After 
all, self-care is not only self-indulgence or advancement of one’s personal goals, but 
also includes feeling that one is being useful and compassionate to others. And for many 
of us, awareness of one’s emotions includes acknowledging a genuine enjoyment of 
intellectual challenges. 
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 A partnership approach to psychotherapy notes the daunting complexity of human 
mental life and the need for the human brain to bridge a variety of paradoxes to live 
life at its best (Grossberg, 2000). Respect for the mind’s complexity requires that we 
evaluate an individual’s conflicts with regard to the person’s level of development 
(mental, emotional, physical, and spiritual). As Erikson (1950) discussed, the struggles 
of adult life (e.g., “generativity versus stagnation” and “ego integrity versus despair”) 
deal with different issues than the struggles of adolescence (e.g., “identity versus role 
confusion”) or childhood (e.g., “basic trust versus basic mistrust”). The implications of 
neural network dynamics support Erikson’s general conclusions but suggest there could 
be wide individual variations in the ages at which conflicts occur. Psychotherapists need 
to avoid reducing all personal struggles and conflicts to the lowest common 
denominator, or confusing anxiety about a higher-level need with anxiety about a 
lower-level need. For example, many people, particularly from oppressed or victimized 
groups, have difficulty asserting their rights and asking for what they want even when 
they feel they deserve it. Mainstream psychotherapy tends to regard that as a problem 
of low self-esteem, but I have argued elsewhere (Levine, 1998b) that it comes from 
cognitive dissonance between high self-esteem and underestimation of one’s power to 
change things. Treating it as a self-esteem issue is potentially harmful because it 
attributes societal victimization to the individual; also it negates the growth the person 
may have already made in identifying her or his disempowerment. What is needed 
instead is a form of assertion training that is strongly integrated with consideration for 
others. 
 
As Maslow (1968, 1971) pointed out, when lower-level needs have been met, a person 
may not move immediately toward absolute contentment but instead move to a higher 
level of discontent! For example, if an underemployed person succeeds in getting a 
steady job, her or his grumbling about lack of a job might be replaced by grumbling 
about whether the job expresses her or his deepest aspirations. If the personal 
fulfillment issues get resolved, that can in turn be replaced by grumbling about the 
general unfairness of society. 
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 As people make peace with aspects of their lives and take on new challenges, they 
naturally get anxious about their ability to succeed in more difficult tasks. When 
someone takes on a new challenge, however, the stress can make her or him revert to 
sub-optimal behavior patterns that were previously abandoned in easier situations. At 
those times, other people — including the media, if the person is a public figure, and 
therapists — may become more critical of her or him than is justified.  This happened, 
for example, to Michael Dukakis when he ran for President in 1988. Dukakis had once 
lost re-election as Governor of Massachusetts, in part because he often spoke in an 
overly unemotional tone that didn’t connect well with voters. He had overcome that 
tendency enough to win back his office two years later and serve two successful terms 
as Governor. Later, when he ran for President and was perceived by some as soft on 
crime, a reporter asked him how he would react if a criminal raped his wife. In this and 
other occasions he reverted to his earlier flat affect, which subjected him to sharp 
media criticism. 
 
Psychotherapists need to show compassion toward those who are experiencing stress 
from taking on new challenges. They also need to give these people credit for past 
growth that may be temporarily extinguished by their current stresses. After all, many 
experiments on animal conditioning show that responses that were once learned and 
later extinguished can be re-learned faster than they were learned in the first place 
(Pavlov, 1927; Ricker & Bouton, 1996). Our tendency to be critical of people who make 
partial efforts in the right direction may be an offshoot of the Western overemphasis 
on definite solutions (Saul, 1992). The more we as can overcome the bias toward 
finished solutions and live with temporary incompleteness, the more people will be 
encouraged to stretch their limits, which is what we need to create and maintain a 
partnership society. 
 
Politics 
A synthetic approach to politics is called for. Such an approach transcends the 
traditional distinctions of conservative versus liberal but includes the best of each. 
From traditional liberalism it will gather the notion of activist government that openly 
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 seeks to promote the welfare of average people. (We can see an analog for this form 
of government in the individual human brain!) From conservatism it will gather the 
notion that enduring values and communities are important.  
 
One of the more promising current political syntheses in the United States is the politics 
of meaning movement (Lerner, 1987, 2006).  Its major proponent, rabbi and magazine 
editor Michael Lerner, advocates a brand of liberalism that avoids two of liberalism’s 
traditional traps. One of these traps is “the myth of externality”, meaning the belief 
that people make political decisions solely on the basis of narrow economic self-interest 
— which recent experimental results in decision psychology and behavioral economics 
argue strongly against. The other liberal trap is “the excessive focus on individual 
rights” (Lerner, 1987, p.2). Instead, Lerner’s vision is of a participatory political system 
in which people feel a sense of community, and all interest groups engage in mutually 
respectful dialogue. If small intentional communities (Communities Directory, 1996) are 
accurate guides, such dialogue can become quite emotional and personal as issues are 
ironed out. 
 
Hence, our prescriptions for politics are an echo of the notion from utopian fiction that 
bridges should be built between opposing positions, rather than each side seeking 
simply to “win.” To promote human welfare in our tense and complex global society, 
we certainly need to take strong stands on many issues including peace, the 
environment, income inequality, and health care. But politics, like psychotherapy, has 
suffered from the Western prejudice in favor of reaching definite answers, even if the 
answers found aren’t good ones (Saul, 1992). Presidents and prime ministers are 
criticized as vacillating or weak if they don’t come quickly to decisive action, regardless 
of the daunting complexity of the problems they deal with. Leaders of the men’s 
movement trace this strain in Western politics to images of masculinity that have grown 
up over the centuries (Fasteau, 1975; Gerzon, 1982). Political leaders are still predomi-
nantly male. Like other men, they feel the need to “prove their manhood” by showing 
they are strong and not weak, even when the action they take to demonstrate their 
strength is inappropriate. We hope that the growing influence of women in politics (for 
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 example, as elected heads of state in more than thirty countries) can help us see the 
value of taking risks on the way to solving these big problems (see Taylor, 2002). 
 
We can see broad visions for where we want to take the world in the next century.  But 
within these visions there should be few preset plans. Rather, we need to experiment, 
as long as we take care that people don’t suffer too much from being “guinea pigs.” In 
any social experiment, those people whose lives are strongly affected by the outcome 
should also be participants. Also, we need to complement social change with the long-
term outlook, suggested by partnership-oriented religion, which allows for 
contemplation as well as action. 
 
Economics 
The partnership approach to economics is discussed thoroughly in Eisler (2007). One of 
its most important aspects is placing a positive value on caring. This means that care 
of children, the elderly, and people in need would be considered a positive social value 
and not a cost or drain on the economy as they are presently considered. Conversely, 
industrial pollution and armaments manufacturing, which are now considered positive 
contributions to the GDP, would be considered as negative values.  So Eisler (2007) 
advocates a new method for measuring countries’ economic health that incorporates 
social values; more details are found in Ghosh (2014). Eisler also calls for much better 
pay and professional training for those engaged in caring professions, including day care 
workers and home health aides who in the United States are now unlicensed and 
working at near minimum wage. 
 
Our review of decision psychology points the way toward theory that supports a (world-
wide) partnership economy. Traditional economic theory is based on the notion of an 
all-powerful market in which buyers and sellers, capitalists and laborers are all self-
interested actors trying to maximize their own net earnings (called utility).  While the 
self-interested utility-maximizing model is still dominant in academic economics 
departments, there is a growing presence of behavioral economics that takes into 
account the complexity and plasticity of real human motivations including social 
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 cooperation (e.g., Thaler, 2015). In fact, Thaler and Sunstein (2009) distinguish 
between the decision-making process of “humans”, who are subject to emotional and 
contextual influences, and the processes of “econs”, who mechanically follow logical 
rules (pp. 6-8).  An increasing number of Nobel Prizes in economics have gone to 
individuals whose approach deviates from the classical self-interest model, including 
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Krugman, Elinor Ostrom, Amartya Sen, and Joseph Stiglitz. 
 
The neuroscience results reviewed in this article indicate that caring makes a positive 
difference and excessive stress makes a negative difference in human lives, no less in 
the workplace than anywhere else. Consequently, as Eisler (2007) documents, the 
choice between an organization being efficient and one that cares for its employees is 
a false one, because on the average, employees who are well treated are more 
productive and perform better. Surveys of employee attitudes have consistently shown 
that supportive working conditions are at least as important as salary in promoting job 
satisfaction (see, e.g., Happiness in the workplace survey, 2011). This means that 
employees feel that they are given initiative (“democracy of creativity”), their 
contributions are respected, and their family and personal needs are honored with 
flexible time arrangements. 
 
Because of the quantitative nature of what they deal with, economists are often drawn 
to mathematical modeling. One of the reasons the self-interested, rational, utility-
maximizing theory has remained popular is that it is easier to handle mathematically 
than a theory that also encompasses emotional factors and mutual cooperation. While 
the mapping between models and data is still less precise, though, a few investigators 
are starting to build mathematical models of economic behavior that incorporate 
emotions as well as reason (e.g., Grossberg, 2013; Grossberg & Gutowski, 1987; Levine, 
2012; Mengov, 2014; Mukherjee, 2010) and cooperation as well as self-interest (e.g., 
Levine, 2006b; Lynne, 2006). There is a feedback between theory and practice, so that 
the emergence of scientific economic theories compatible with a partnership model 
can encourage the growth of partnership economic structures. 
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 Family and sex 
The partnership approach to sex and the family is depicted in Eisler’s Sacred Pleasure: 
Sex, Myth, and the Politics of the Body (1995). That book emphasizes that the quality, 
whether partnership- or dominator-based, of relationships within the family is a 
microcosm for the quality of relationships in the larger society. Thus it is of prime 
importance for building partnership relations to replace the patriarchal conception of 
the father-dominated household with one where all adults, female and male, have 
roughly equal influence. Between adults and children there will still be some inequality, 
because children’s brains are not fully developed, so that instruction and parental 
authority are necessary. But the hierarchy between parents or other adults and children 
is what Eisler calls a hierarchy of actualization, one that emphasizes the development 
of each child’s individual creativity and independence rather than the obedience that 
the dominator ethic emphasizes (cf. Levine, 2009). The family that results can 
sometimes be the traditional nuclear family of mother, father, and children but is not 
restricted to that; a variety of potential extended family arrangements are possible as 
long as they adhere to the partnership model. 
 
In the partnership model, as Eisler (1995) notes, sexuality for both men and women is 
treated as a source of pleasure and bonding, not as something dirty or immoral. 
Heterosexual monogamy is likely to be the most common form of sexual arrangement, 
but homosexuality is equally accepted if it is part of a loving relationship, and 
multiplicity of sexual partners (polyamory) is accepted if it is open and based on mutual 
trust (which occurs in such societies as the Musuo of China, as Eisler documents). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our society’s understanding of human brain organization and function has grown 
explosively since the start of the 21st Century. Already the new knowledge of the brain 
has permeated the popular press as well as education, psychotherapy, and computer 
engineering. It is now well established, for example, that brain connections, once 
through to be fully formed at birth, are profoundly influenced by experience, including 
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 both nurturing and stressful experience. It is also well established that emotion and 
cognition, once thought to be in opposition, work together to make sense of a changing 
environment. 
 
Yet society has not reaped the full benefits of our knowledge about the brain.  Engineers 
are using this knowledge to advance their vision of increasing roles for robots and other 
artificial intelligence devices, sometimes without regard for the human costs of 
technology. Psychiatric professionals are using this knowledge to “medicalize” 
treatment of emotional and mental disorders, sometimes wisely and sometimes 
unwisely. Now humanists and social reformers need to reclaim the advances in brain 
science for their own purposes. 
 
The picture that neuroscience, experimental psychology, and neural network theory 
yield is of a complex dynamical system of interacting subsystems with many mutual 
influences but no subsystem in total control. In other words, our brains and minds 
themselves are in many respects analogous to a partnership society. As our scientific 
knowledge increases, I expect that more and more evidence will emerge that 
partnership interactions broadly serve to maximize achievement of our biological goals: 
not just the evolutionary goals of survival and reproduction but also the spiritual goals 
of meaningfulness and actualization. 
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